Using a bootstrap approach to rate the raters by Güttler, André
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES: FINANCE & ACCOUNTING
 
André Güttler 
Using a Bootstrap Approach to Rate the Raters  
 
No. 132 
October 2004 
JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT 
FRANKFURT AM MAIN 
 
FACHBEREICH WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFTEN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
André Güttler
† 
 
 
USING A BOOTSTRAP APPROACH TO RATE THE RATERS
* 
 
 
No. 132 
October 2004 
 
 
ISSN 1434-3401 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
† André Güttler, University of Frankfurt, Mertonstrasse 17, 60054 Frankfurt, Germany, guettler@finance.uni-frankfurt.de, 
+49 69 798 23143. 
 
* I would like to thank Patrick Behr, Axel Eisenkopf, Hergen Frerichs, Gunther Löffler, Lars Norden, Peter Raupach, Mark 
Wahrenburg, participants in the EFMA conference 2004 in Basel, participants in the Augustin Cournot Doctoral Days 2004 
in Strasbourg and a referee for their helpful comments. 
  
Working Paper Series Finance and Accounting are intended to make research findings available to other researchers in 
preliminary form, to encourage discussion and suggestions for revision before final publication. Opinions are solely those of 
the authors   
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper compares the accuracy of credit ratings of Moody’s and 
Standard&Poor`s. Based on 11,428 issuer ratings and 350 defaults in several 
datasets from 1999 to 2003 a slight advantage for the rating system of Moody’s is 
detected. Compared to former research the robustness of the results is increased by 
using nonparametric bootstrap approaches. Furthermore, robustness checks are 
made to control for the impact of Watchlist entries, staleness of ratings and the 
effect of unsolicited ratings on the results. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Investors and regulators use credit ratings by private rating agencies to economize on 
the resources they devote to credit risk evaluation. Starting in a small niche at the 
beginning of the last century, the rating industry has grown to a billion dollar business 
which is dominated by three international rating agencies, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) and Fitch Ratings. Only these three agencies, and the minor DBRS, are so called 
NRSROs, i.e. statistical ratings organizations that have been officially recognized by 
the SEC, and they therefore play an important role in the regulation of investment 
activities by investment funds and banks in the US. Since an agency needs to be able to 
provide international coverage in order to be accepted as an authority by international 
investors, yet cannot gain access to the all-important US market without the NRSRO 
status, the regulation of rating agencies in the US increases the market barriers 
substantially. Market entry is also made more difficult for rating agencies by the 
necessity of reputation-building. Investors only believe in ratings if their quality has 
been proven over several years. These two factors largely account for the oligopolistic 
market structure in the rating business, which yields huge rating fees and wide margins 
for the three big players. Nowadays, the market value of the three big rating agencies – 
Moody’s, for example, was worth about $10B in September 2004 – often exceeds the 
value of the companies they rate. In contrast to the widely regulated banking sector, the 
more and more powerful rating agencies are not regulated or even analyzed on a 
regular basis. No benchmarking of the quality of default predictions by independent 
parties takes place. The market participants rely on the agency’s annual default reports 
as the only source of performance verification.  
This paper benchmarks the quality of default predictions by Moody’s and S&P, a topic 
which is motivated by a number of factors. First, the benchmarking of external credit 
rating agencies has huge economic relevance, given that the quality of credit ratings is 
an important factor in determining the level of regulatory capital for banks using the 
standardized approach of Basel II (BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION 2004), and also in investment regulation (as reflected, for example, in 
the fact that mutual funds in the US are not allowed to hold non-investment grade rated 
assets). Indirectly, risk adequate credit ratings are also important for the optimal  2  
allocation of capital to bond issuers since the (re)financing costs of bonds depend very 
much on the credit rating of the bond. Risk inadequate credit ratings would, ceteris 
paribus, result in exaggeratedly high (low) required yields in the case of an 
exaggeratedly bad (good) rating and would therefore undermine the optimal allocation 
of capital. Second, the differences in power between rating systems have vast economic 
effects. Based on simulations, STEIN and JORDÃO (2003) demonstrate that for a 
medium sized bank with assets of $50B a 5% more powerful rating system in respect to 
a certain validation measure results in a profitability increase of $3.4MM to $6.2MM 
per year.[1] The results of independent benchmarking should therefore be of interest not 
only to investors but also to banks and regulatory authorities.  
The difficulty of comparing different rating systems, regardless of whether they stem 
from banks or external rating agencies, lies in the scarcity of data. For validation 
purposes, rating and default data for at least two rating instances are required. Since 
banks do not provide this kind of data to the public for business policy and legal 
reasons, the data compiled by rating agencies is the best alternative. But even when 
rating and default data for two or more rating bodies are available, the mapping of the 
issuers or debtors is far from trivial. In many countries, e.g. Germany, there are no 
identification numbers for private firms.[2] Even for the publicly traded companies with 
an external rating, no single data source with rating and default data is available.  
Considering the difficulty of obtaining the required data, it is not surprising that to date 
there is only one paper, by KRÄMER and GÜTTLER (2003), which assesses the 
different quality of default predictions by two rating bodies. KRÄMER and GÜTTLER 
(2003) consider Moody’s and S&P, and conclude that Moody’s outperforms S&P in 
most of the analyzed validation criteria for ratings of 1,927 issuers as at the end of 1998 
and a four-year realization phase from 1999 to 2002 with 209 defaults. The rest of the 
literature is based either on rating data for several rating bodies but no default data (e.g. 
CANTOR and PACKER 1997), or on rating and default data for only one rating body 
(e.g. ENGELMANN et al. 2003), or on rating and default data for one rating body plus 
equity-based measures of default risk (LÖFFLER forthcoming). 
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature, and especially to the paper of 
KRÄMER and GÜTTLER (2003), is threefold: the dataset of this paper is broader than  3  
the former study because it includes 11,428 issuer ratings and 350 defaults in four 
datasets from 1999 to 2003 (four is the maximum number of datasets for a period of 
five years, given the need to form pairs of rating observations for one year and default 
observations of the subsequent year). By using one-year realization periods instead of 
the four-year realization periods used by KRÄMER and GÜTTLER (2003) to 
determine the accuracy of ratings is in accordance with market practice, i.e. the default 
reports of Moody’s and S&P, and it conforms to the requirements of the internal 
ratings-based approaches of Basel II (BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION 2004). Besides, the calculation of bootstrapped confidence intervals 
obviates the need to use parametric or otherwise potentially problematic test statistics. 
Bootstrapping also makes it possible to compute confidence intervals for all validation 
measures which are available. Finally, robustness checks are made to control for the 
impact of Watchlist entries, staleness of ratings and the effect of unsolicited ratings on 
the results.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the dataset and 
the mapping of the two rating systems used by Moody’s and S&P, respectively. Section 
3 provides the methodological background of the validation measures. Section 4 gives 
a review of the bootstrap approach. The following section reports the empirical results, 
and section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Data 
 
To analyze two different rating systems it is essential to have a dataset of multiple rated 
issuers over an identical time-span. First, this is necessary to avoid misleading results 
due to sample selection. For example, comparing a rating agency that rates all issuers in 
a certain region with another agency that only rates a certain sector of issuers is not 
adequate. Roughly speaking, if this sector is not representative of the whole population 
of issuers, it is like comparing apples and oranges. Second, due to the calculation of 
validation measures, a rating agency with a homogenous set of good rated issuers may 
have a worse validation measure than a rating agency with a high risk portfolio of rated 
issuers (HAMERLE et al. 2003).   4  
Since no database has actually been established with historical data for two or more 
rating agencies, manual mapping of data sources for rating and default data is required. 
The rating data is obtained from Bloomberg while default data is received directly from 
Moody’s and S&P. Hence, the analysis is based on four datasets of borrowers, mostly 
industrial firms and financial institutions, which have a senior, unsecured, long term 
credit rating by both Moody’s and S&P as of the end of the years 1999, 2000, 2001 and 
2002 (see Figure 1). In the following, the year preceding each of these dates is referred 
to as the estimation period. Between 2000 and 2003 all defaults by these firms are 
recorded to construct realization periods each with a length of one year.[3] Default data 
are obtained from the annual default reports of Moody’s and S&P. In this study a 
default is defined as such if Moody’s and S&P reported a default in the year following 
the year of the respective estimation period. The default date is defined as the first 
default date if there are different default dates in the two default reports. In total, 350 
multiple default reports were published in the years 2000–2003 (see Table 1). In all 
years, S&P reported a higher number of defaults than Moody’s. This reflects the fact 
that rated issuers with a long-term or issuer rating by S&P numbered 6,848, as against 
the 4,813 rated issuers with an issuer rating by Moody’s.[4]  
  
Table 1: Observations of defaulted issuers 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Published by Moody's  111  160  122  68  461 
Published by S&P  110  189  163  93  555 
Published by both  88  122  92  48  350 
The table shows the number of defaults published in the annual default reports of Moody's and S&P with a long-term or issuer 
rating in Bloomberg. A multiple default is defined as such if both agencies published a default. If different default dates are 
reported, only the earliest of these default dates is taken into account. 
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The number of defaults should not be affected by the default definitions of the rating 
agencies, since they are quite similar. Moody’s and S&P define a default according to 
the following three categories (MOODY’S 2004) and S&P (STANDARD&POORS 
2004): 
 
1) first occurrence of missed or delayed payments of interest and/or principal 
2) bankruptcy as defined by Chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy code 
3) distressed exchange, which diminishes the value of financial obligations 
 
But besides these three categories, there are some differences in the definitions of 
default between Moody’s and S&P. For example, S&P, unlike Moody’s, does not claim 
a default when an interest payment missed on the due date is made within the grace 
period, whereas Moody’s does not disclose defaults by issuers with an unsolicited 
rating.   
Sample adjustments were made for issuers that defaulted in the year before and in the 
estimation period and which were given a withdrawn rating during the estimation 
period by at least one rating agency (see Figure 1). This was done to include only 
active rated issuers with multiple ratings. Four pairs of data were built, each of them 
with rating data at the end of one estimation period and one year with default data, i.e., 
the realization period. After all adjustments had been made, among the 2,802 issuers 
covered in the 1999 estimation period, 82 defaults were detected in the corresponding 
realization period 2000, which translates into a one-year default rate of 2.93% (for the 
pairs 2000/2001, 2001/2002 and 2002/2003 the corresponding figures were: 2,874, 110, 
3.83%; 2,873, 87, 3.03%; 2,879, 45, 1.56%). These four years include periods with 
record numbers of defaults, e.g., 2002 with a default rate of almost 4%, and also 
periods with healthy economic conditions, such as 2003 with a default rate of 1.56%. 
Additionally, all computations were also made on the aggregate number of 11,428 
issuer ratings and 350 defaults over the four years, yielding an average default 
frequency of 3.1%. 
  6  
Figure 1: Construction of the first pair of estimation period (1999) and subsequent 
realization period (2000) 
1/1999 1/2000 1/2001
Estimation period Realization period
Adjustments for
defaulted issuers
Adjustments for
withdrawn ratings
Multiple, active ratings
as of 12/1999 (2,802)
Defaults (82)
Non-defaults (2,720)
 
 
The two rating agencies under observation apply significantly different rating 
approaches. Moody’s long-term ratings measure the total expected credit loss over the 
life of the security, i.e. they are an assessment of both the likelihood that the issuer will 
default on a security, and the amount of loss after a default occurs (ESTRELLA 2000). 
This is often called the expected loss approach. In contrast, S&P only assesses the 
probability of default.  
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Table 2: Regional distribution of issuers 
Country  12/99 12/00 12/01 12/02 
US  71.00% 68.12% 66.19% 66.40% 
Great Britain  5.00%  5.74% 5.85% 5.00% 
Japan  4.61% 5.15% 5.22% 5.28% 
Canada  2.89% 2.99% 3.13% 3.02% 
Australia  1.61% 1.57% 1.95% 2.08% 
France  1.71% 1.57% 1.57% 1.67% 
Netherlands  1.29% 1.64% 1.81% 2.05% 
Germany  1.61% 1.74% 1.74% 1.60% 
Argentina 1.00%  1.08% 1.01% 1.01% 
Mexico  0.79% 0.77% 0.49% 0.31% 
Other 8.50%  9.64%  11.04%  11.57% 
Number of Issuers  2,802  2,874  2,873  2,879 
The table shows the regional distribution of issuers of the four estimation periods using rating data from Bloomberg. All quantities 
refer to the end of the respective year. Only multiple rated issuers, i.e. with a valid long-term unsecured credit rating by both 
Moody's and S&P are included. 
 
Conventionally in the literature (e.g. CANTOR et al. 1997), the different rating scales 
of the two rating agencies are mapped to a single numeric scale, with better ratings 
corresponding to lower numbers: Aaa = AAA = 1, Aa1 = AA+ = 2, … B3 = B- = 16 
and C = 17 (see Appendix A). All issuers with a rating worse than B3 or B- are lumped 
together in the mapped rating class 17. This is done because only a few issuers are 
rated in these low classes. The default frequencies of the own sample are calculated by 
dividing the number of defaults by the number of ratings for each rating grade for the 
respective realization periods. Hence, average default frequencies are calculated over 
the four periods 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003. In comparison with the long-term 
historical averages of Moody’s and S&P, which are calculated over more than 20 years, 
they are clearly higher, especially for the non-investment grade rating classes. This is 
mainly due to the inclusion of the years 2001 and 2002 with record numbers of 
defaults.  8  
The sample is dominated by US issuers (see Table 2), which is common for studies 
with credit ratings. This is due to the fact that Moody’s and S&P are both US-
domiciled, and did not start to expand into other markets until the 1990s. Markets 
outside the US are growing, as one can easily see even in these four years. In the 
selected samples of multiple rated issuers the ratio of US-rated issuers decreases from 
71% to 66.4% at the end of 2002. 
 
3 Validation  measures 
 
3.1  Receiver Operating Characteristic curve 
 
The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is a commonly used validation 
technique with its origin in signal detection theory, psychology and medicine. For 
validation purposes the size of the area below an ROC curve is of special interest 
(SOBEHART and KEENAN 2001 and ENGELMANN et al. 2003).   
The construction of an ROC curve can best be explained through two possible 
distributions of continuous scores for non-defaulting and defaulting issuers. For well-
designed rating systems the distribution of the non-defaulting issuers should have better 
scores on average than the distribution of defaulting issuers. To decide which issuers 
will survive during the next period and which issuers will default, the decision-maker 
might introduce a threshold, C, and classify each issuer with a score lower than C as a 
defaulter and each issuer with a higher score as a non-defaulter. If the score is below 
the cut-off value and the issuer subsequently defaults, the decision was correct. 
Otherwise the decision-maker incorrectly classified a non-defaulter as a defaulter. If the 
score is above the cut-off value and the issuer does not default, the classification was 
accurate. Otherwise, a defaulter was incorrectly assigned to the non-defaulters group. 
Using the notation of SOBEHART and KEENAN (2001), the hit rate HR(C) is defined 
as: 
() ()
D N
C H
C HR =   (1)  9  
where H(C) is the number of defaulters predicted correctly with the cut-off value C, 
and ND is the total number of defaulters in the sample. The false alarm rate FAR(C) is 
defined as: 
() ()
ND N
C F
C FAR =  (2) 
where F(C) is the number of false alarms, i.e. the quantity of non-defaulters that were 
classified mistakenly as defaulters by using the cut-off value. The total number of non-
defaulters in the sample is denoted by NND. Hence, the ROC curve is constructed as 
follows. For all cut-off values C that are contained in the range of the scores the 
quantities HR(C) and FAR(C) are calculated. The ROC curve is a plot of HR(C) versus 
FAR(C). The larger the area under the ROC curve, which is defined as AUC: 
() () ∫ =
1
0
FAR d FAR HR AUC  (3) 
the better the rating model’s performance is. The area under the ROC curve is 0.5 for a 
random model without discriminative power, 1 for an ideal model and between 0.5 and 
1 for any rating model in practice. By construction, the ROC curve and the AUC only 
measure the refinement of default predictions. The concept of refinement pertains to 
how spread out the default predictions of a rating system are (DEGROOT and 
FIENBERG 1983). In other words, the more predictions of 0% or 100% are assigned to 
issuers, the more refined the rating system is.  
 
3.2 Scoring  rules 
 
Scoring rules are a second class of validation measures (WINKLER 1996). Their role is 
to provide summary measures to evaluate probabilities in the light of what actually 
happens. Besides sharpness, the degree of calibration is also taken into account by 
these measures since they are based on probabilities of default. Calibration is based on 
the level of agreement between a rating system’s default predictions and the actual 
observed relative frequency of default (DEGROOT and FIENBERG 1983). A rating 
system is said to be well calibrated if among those issuers for whom its default  10 
prediction is a certain probability x, the long-run relative frequency of default is also 
x.[5] 
The well-known Brier score (BRIER 1950) is often denoted in the form: 
∑ =
− θ =
n
1 i
2
i i ) q ( n / 1 B  (4) 
where i indicates an issuer (i = 1,…,n), θ is a binary variable (1 if a default occurs, 0 
otherwise) and q denotes the probability that a default will occur. This score takes its 
optimum value of B = 0 when the only predicted probabilities of default are 0 and 1 
and the predictions are always correct. It takes its worst value of B = 1 when the only 
predicted probabilities of default are 0 and 1 and always the opposite of what has been 
predicted occurs. 
The logarithmic score is given by: 
() ∑ =
− θ + =
n
1 i i i 1 q LN n / 1 L  (5) 
The logarithmic score is always negative, with closeness to zero signaling good 
performance. The spherical score is defined by: 
() ∑ =
− +
− θ +
=
n
1 i 2
i
2
i
i i
q 1 q
1 q
n / 1 S . (6) 
This rule is always positive, with large values indicating an improvement in 
performance. 
 
4 Bootstrapping 
 
A fundamental task of quantitative research is to make inferences about a population 
characteristic based on an estimator using a sample drawn from that population. 
Bootstrapping differs from the traditional parametric approach in that it employs a large 
number of repetitive computations to estimate the shape of a statistic’s sample 
distribution. This allows drawing inferences in cases where such assumptions are 
untenable or no parametric statistics exist. Bootstrapping relies on the analogy between 
the sample and the population from which the sample was drawn. The central idea is  11 
that it may sometimes be better to derive conclusions about the characteristics of a 
population strictly from the sample at hand, rather than making unrealistic assumptions 
about that population. Bootstrapping involves resampling the data with replacement 
many times in order to generate an empirical estimate of the entire sampling 
distribution of a statistic. Although each resample will have the same number of 
elements as the original sample (n = size of the sample = size of the resample), through 
replacement each resample could have some of the original data points represented in it 
more than once, and some not represented at all. Therefore, each of these resamples 
will likely be slightly and randomly different from the original sample.  
In this study, nonparametric confidential intervals are calculated for the four validation 
measures described in section 3. Whereas statistics for the comparison of AUC 
(DELONG et al. 1988) and Brier scores (REDELMEIER et al. 1991) of different rating 
systems can be found in the literature, no such statistics are available for the 
comparison of logarithmic or spherical scores. The bootstrap approach therefore makes 
it possible to use all these available validation measures with comparable results for all 
of them. Besides, no assumptions about the distribution are necessary.  
Essentially, bootstrapping follows five basic steps:  
 
1) Construct an empirical probability distribution from the sample by placing a 
probability of 1/n at each issuer (x1, x2, …, xn).  
2) Draw a random sample of size n with replacement. 
3) Calculate the statistic of interest from this resample. 
4) Repeat steps 2 and 3 B times. B should be at least 1,000 to estimate confidence 
intervals around the statistic of interest (EFRON 1987). 
5) Construct a probability distribution from the B statistics of interest by placing a 
probability of 1/B at each single statistic. This distribution is the bootstrapped estimate 
of the sampling distribution of the statistic of interest. This distribution can be used to 
make inferences about the population characteristic. 
  12 
The percentile method, a simple, but very intuitive method, is used to construct 
confidence intervals for the area under the ROC curve and the three scoring rules.[6] If 
someone draws 1,000 resamples and calculates the statistic of interest 1,000 times, a 
5% two-sided confidence interval would be based on the 25th-lowest and the 25th-
highest value of these statistics. A test for comparing two quantities of a statistic of 
interest requires the calculation of B numbers of the statistic for Moody’s and S&P, and 
their differences. The H0-hypothesis proposes that the mean difference of the respective 
statistic does not equal zero. The H0-hypothesis has to be rejected if the calculated 
confidence interval on a significance level of α does not cover zero.  
 
5 Empirical  results 
 
Aside from the paper by KRÄMER and GÜTTLER (2003), which also employs rating 
and default data, earlier studies made use of rating data only. Hence, the comparison of 
ratings was given special importance. First, in previous studies it was important to 
analyze whether so called “rating shopping” is observable. Rating shopping 
characterizes issuers who seek an inflated rating (JEWELL and LIVINGSTON 1999). 
Only if the requested rating is favorable does the company publish it. If it is not 
favorable, the issuer pays for the rating but does not release it. Second, a matter of 
special interest was whether the default risk is more difficult to assess in some business 
sectors, e.g. the banking sector, than in others (MORGAN 2002).  
Table 3 provides an overview of the distribution (the detailed distribution of ratings is 
given in Appendix B) and the direction of split ratings of the own dataset and three 
other studies. One criterion for the choice of these three studies was that all of their 
observation periods occur after the introduction of additional rating classes by Moody’s 
in April 1982, following the lead taken by S&P seven years earlier. Cantor and Packer 
(1997) analyze rating differences of 4,399 straight bond, US dollar-denominated, 
public offerings by US corporations from 1983-1993. Perry (1985) observes ratings of 
218 recently issued unsubordinated bonds for non-financial corporations for May, 
1982. Ederington and Yawitz (1987) present results for 388 industrial bonds at the end 
of 1982. The results of these three studies are quite similar: Moody’s and S&P agree in  13 
41.8 to 45.3% of all cases. In 5 to 18.3% they disagree by two notches (a notch 
signifies the step from one rating grade to the next, e.g. from BB to BB+) or more. The 
results for the own, more recent sample with rating data from the period 1999 to 2002 
fall nearly in line with the earlier research. 40% are identically rated by Moody’s and 
S&P whereas they disagree by two or more notches for 19.1% of all issuers.  
 
Table 3: Distribution and direction of split ratings by Moody’s and S&P 
Panel I: Distribution of split ratings          
  Own sample  CANTOR et al. (1997)  PERRY (1985)  EDERINGTON et al. (1987) 
Identically rated  39.98%  45.33%  41.74%  41.75% 
One notch  40.93%  42.12%  44.50%  39.95% 
Two notches  14.01%  10.00%  4.13%  13.66% 
Three  notches 3.34% 2.21% 0.46%  4.12% 
>  three  notches  1.74% 0.34% 0.46%  0.52% 
Panel II: Analysis of split ratings (Moody's rating is lower than S&P’s) 
  Own sample  CANTOR et al. (1997)  PERRY (1985)  EDERINGTON et al. (1987) 
All split ratings  62.25%  54.44%  62.20%  56.64% 
Investment grade  52.42%  59.58%  65.22%  61.94% 
Non-investment grade  75.19%  30.68%  33.33%  45.07% 
The split ratings for the own sample are given as averages of the four one-year periods 1999 - 2002. The analysis of split ratings 
in Panel II, where the rating by Moody's is lower than the respective rating by S&P, gives ratios according to S&P’s rating in the 
case of investment grade and non-investment grade ratings. 
 
Greater differences between this dataset and earlier studies exist in a further analysis of 
the split ratings. Over all split ratings, Moody’s assigns lower ratings. This is a stable 
result in all empirical studies. In the other three studies this is attributable to the lower 
ratings for investment grade rated issuers. In this study Moody’s also assigns slightly 
lower ratings for investment grade rated issuers. But the main effect stems from the 
non-investment grade issuers. Whereas the other three studies find that in this range of 
ratings Moody’s assigns higher ratings, this study discovers an obvious majority of 
lower ratings. A possible explanation might be a change to more stringent rating 
standards. BLUME et al. (1998) show for S&P that there was a trend towards more  
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stringent rating standards for a panel of issuers over the time period 1978 to 1993. 
Unfortunately, their study does not also contain rating data from Moody’s. The results 
presented in Table 3, Panel II, would seem to be plausible if the shift towards more 
stringent rating standards over the last decade was even more pronounced at Moody’s 
than at S&P. 
Table 4 presents the results of the four validation measures in Panels I and II, while 
Panel III shows the differences between Moody’s and S&P as well as one-sided 
significance levels based on bootstrapped confidence intervals. The percentile bootstrap 
method was used for computing these intervals. Whereas the AUC of the ROC curve is 
based on the mapped numerical ratings, the three validation scores are calculated by 
using the default frequencies of the own sample as shown in Appendix A. Columns two 
to five contain the results for the four one-year periods. Column six presents the results 
for the aggregation of all four periods. Since positive differences in Panel III indicate 
an advantage for Moody’s, and all four validation measures favor Moody’s, this rating 
agency leads for the aggregated dataset with all issuer ratings and defaults. For the 
spherical score this difference is significant on the 10% level. This advantage for 
Moody’s results mainly from its superior performance in the years 2001 and 2002. In 
2001 the differences in the Brier and the spherical score are not equal to zero on the 
10% level. For 2002 the differences are significant on the 5% level for the logarithmic 
score and on the 1% level for the Brier and the spherical score. For the years 1999 and 
2000 there are no significant results. S&P tends to perform better in these two years. 
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Table 4: Differences of risk assessments 
Estimation  12/1999 12/2000 12/2001 12/2002 
Realization  period  1/2000-12/2000 1/2001-12/2001 1/2002-12/2002 1/2003-12/2003 
all 
Panel I: Validation measures for issuers rated by Moody's 
AUC  0.9039 0.8916 0.8828 0.9298 0.8963 
Brier  score  0.0254 0.0316 0.0258 0.0164 0.0248 
Logarithmic  score -0.0950 -0.1161 -0.0993 -0.0645 -0.0937 
Spherical  score  0.9729 0.9661 0.9724 0.9828 0.9736 
Panel II: Validation measures for issuers rated by S&P 
AUC  0.9016 0.8953 0.8764 0.9256 0.8948 
Brier  score  0.0248 0.0310 0.0269 0.0180 0.0252 
Logarithmic  score -0.0946 -0.1134 -0.1030 -0.0685 -0.0949 
Spherical  score  0.9737 0.9665 0.9712 0.9807 0.9730 
Panel III: Differences between Moody's and S&P 
AUC 0.0023  -0.0037  0.0064  0.0042  0.0016 
Brier score  -0.0007  -0.0006  0.0011*  0.0016***  0.0004 
Logarithmic score  -0.0004  -0.0027  0.0037  0.0040**  0.0012 
Spherical  score  -0.0007  -0.0004  0.0012* 0.0021*** 0.0005* 
The validation measures are calculated by using the default frequencies of the own sample (see Appendix A). Panel III presents 
the differences of these measures. For convenience, these differences are multiplied by -1 for the Brier score. Positive differences 
show an advantage for Moody's. One-sided significance levels are given as ***, **, and * representing 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively using the percentile bootstrap method of calculating nonparametric confidence intervals.  
 
On the one hand, the result for the aggregated dataset that Moody’s performs better 
than S&P confirms the outcome of KRÄMER and GÜTTLER (2003) who analyze a 
single estimation at the end of 1998 with a four-year realization period from 1999-
2002. Based on four-year default frequencies the AUC is 0.833 for Moody’s (0.819 for 
S&P), the Brier score is 0.066 (0.0686), the logarithmic score is -0.2005 (-0.2056) and 
the spherical score is 0.9051 (0.9019). All these validation measures are in favor of 
Moody’s. Using the described test statistics (see section 4) they find evidence that 
Moody’s outperforms S&P significantly on the 10% significance level for the AUC and 
on the 1% significance level for the Brier score. But on the other hand, this study  16 
demonstrates that the superiority of Moody’s is not stable over time but that in 1999 
and 2000 no differences in the quality of default predictions are observable.  
Three robustness checks are made to further validate the results of the base case of 
Table 4 (see Table 5 for the differences and the significance levels as well as Appendix 
D for the validation measures). For these checks different default rates are calculated 
because a different mapping procedure is employed and further sample adjustments are 
necessary (see Appendix C).  
First of all, Watchlist entries are incorporated. As part of the rating monitoring process 
an issuer is often placed on a formal rating review, which is called the Watchlist or 
credit watch. These additions to the Watchlist signal to the market participants that a 
rating change will come soon with a high probability but that the rating analysts need 
some more time to assess the intensity and sometimes also the direction of the 
forthcoming rating change. Watchlist announcements are often made after M&A 
activities or corporate restructuring plans have been published. As one example among 
others, HAND et al. (1992) provide evidence for significant abnormal stock returns 
after announcements of additions to the S&P Watchlist. HAMILTON and CANTOR 
(2004) find that the accuracy of default predictions is significantly better if they include 
Watchlist information. Hence, Watchlist additions are an important source of 
information. To incorporate them, the credit rating (or the assigned default rate) is 
downgraded by one notch for a negative Watchlist entry and upgraded by one notch for 
a positive one. To give an example of this adjustment: an issuer with a mapped rating 
of 8 is upgraded by one notch to 7. Panel I of Table 5 presents the results for the 
Watchlist additions. Moody’s still performs better than S&P for the years 2001 and 
2002 as well as for the overall dataset. The difference of the spherical score for the 
overall dataset is even significantly different from zero on the 5% level. Unlike the 
base case of Table 4, S&P is significantly better than Moody’s in the year 2000 
according to all four validation measures on the 10% level.  
 
 
  17 
Table 5: Robustness checks 
Estimation  12/1999 12/2000 12/2001 12/2002 
Realization  period  1/2000-12/2000 1/2001-12/2001 1/2002-12/2002 1/2003-12/2003 
all 
Panel I: Differences between Moody’s and S&P (Watchlist anticipation) 
AUC -0.0047  -0.0100**  0.0042  0.0002  -0.0032 
Brier  score  -0.0012 -0.0014* 0.0016* 0.0032*** 0.0006 
Logarithmic  score  -0.0029 -0.0044* 0.0046* 0.0065*** 0.0010 
Spherical  score  -0.0010  -0.0013*  0.0021** 0.0045*** 0.0011** 
Panel II: Differences between Moody’s and S&P (ratings younger than 2 years) 
AUC  -0.0099 -0.0066 -0.0013 0.0114* -0.0023 
Brier score  -0.0019  -0.0009  0.0012  0.0035***  0.0006 
Logarithmic score  -0.0071  -0.0042  0.0023  0.0090***  0.0004 
Spherical score  -0.0019  -0.0006  0.0017  0.0045***  0.0011* 
Observations  1,505 1,501 1,404 1,801 6,211 
Panel III: Differences between Moody’s and S&P (without unsolicited ratings) 
AUC -0.0012  -0.0068  0.0037  0.0031  -0.0010 
Brier  score  -0.0010  -0.0008  0.0015* 0.0026*** 0.0006* 
Logarithmic score  -0.0017  -0.0040*  0.0040  0.0056***  0.0010 
Spherical  score  -0.0010  -0.0005  0.0019** 0.0034*** 0.0010** 
Observations  2,704 2,759 2,757 2,797  11,017 
The validation measures (see Appendix D) are calculated by using the default frequencies (see Appendix C) of the reduced sub-
samples. For convenience, these differences are multiplied by -1 for the Brier score. Positive differences show an advantage for 
Moody's. One-sided significance levels are given as ***, **, and * representing 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively using the percentile 
bootstrap method of calculating nonparametric confidence intervals. 
 
The second robustness check is designed to control for staleness in ratings. Staleness in 
ratings means that the link between the rating and the factors that influence its 
determination might not truly reflect how the decisions are made by the rating agency 
(AMATO and FURFINE 2003). This could be due to monitoring costs, the 
unavailability of qualified staff and the oligopolistic structure of the rating market, all 
of which raise doubts as to whether suitable resources are in fact allocated to examining 
all rated firms on a permanent basis. Panel II of Table 5 shows the results for a reduced 
sample where only ratings younger than two years are included. Both ratings by  18 
Moody’s and S&P for a specific issuer must fulfill this criterion. The end of the 
estimation period is taken as a reference point for defining a rating as “young”, e.g. for 
the first estimation period 1999 a young rating is one that was published no earlier than 
January 1, 1997. The high ratio of stale ratings can be recognized by the sharp decrease 
in the size of the sub-samples to almost half the original samples. For the overall 
sample Moody’s still dominates S&P with regard to prognostic power. But as regards 
the individual years, only in 2002 does this superiority hold for Moody’s. For the years 
1999 to 2001 there is no clear winner.  
Naturally, issuers initiate and pay for their credit ratings. But there are also issuers on 
the international bond market who do not actively seek credit ratings. Some of them 
still get rated and these unwanted ratings are usually called unsolicited ratings. 
Unsolicited ratings were excluded from this study because of their downward bias 
(POON 2003). There is no data available for both rating agencies because Moody’s, 
unlike S&P, does not publish this kind of information together with its credit ratings. 
Therefore, unsolicited ratings were estimated by inferring that S&P ratings with a pi 
indication (meaning that the rating was based on public information) signify an 
unsolicited rating. Due to the elimination of issuers with a pi rating the sub-samples are 
smaller than the original samples but the average reduction is smaller than 5%. The 
results are somewhat stronger than in the base case. For the overall sample the 
difference between the spherical scores is significantly different on the 5% level and 
the difference between the Brier scores is different from zero on the 10% level. There is 
also strong support for the superiority of Moody’s for the year 2002 and superiority in 
two scores for 2001. In 2000, S&P shows a better performance according to a 
significant difference on the 10% level for the logarithmic score. 
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6 Concluding  remarks 
 
It has been examined whether the default predictions of Moody’s or S&P are more 
accurate. Using a dataset with more than 11,428 issuer ratings and 350 defaults in four 
datasets from 1999 to 2003 the performance of Moody’s and S&P is assessed by 
bootstrapping the differences revealed by several validation measures. The evidence 
suggests that Moody’s performs slightly better than S&P, which supports the results of 
the first study in this field by KRÄMER and GÜTTLER (2003). Although in this study 
Moody’s does not lead in all observed periods for the aggregated data of all estimation 
and realization periods, Moody’s nonetheless appears to perform significantly better. 
The overall result is driven primarily by the noticeable differences in the predictive 
power of defaults in favor of Moody’s in the estimation periods 2001 and particularly 
2002. Despite the fact that not all periods support the superiority of Moody’s, the 
results of the base case are robust for variations of the mapping procedure as well as for 
different adjustments to account for staleness in ratings and for unsolicited ratings.  
One possible criticism of the study is that the results, based on a relatively short period 
with rating and default data, are driven by chance. However, there is no more data 
available at the moment, because default data prior to 1999 is not published by S&P. 
Therefore, the maximum amount of rating and default data has been used.  
Another potential problem might be the mapping of the different rating scales of 
Moody’s and S&P. As a consequence Moody’s ratings are, on average, lower than the 
ratings of S&P. Of course this could drive results, especially in a period with a high 
number of defaults. Irrespective of the fact that this mapping is done in every study 
which assesses split ratings, it should be noted that the superiority of Moody’s 
performance over that of S&P is particularly noticeable in the last period, with rating 
data as of the end of 2002 and default data as of 2003. Since default rates are lower in 
2003 than in any other year during the observation period, the “conservatism” of 
Moody’s should not bias the results. 
A further limitation of the study is that it compares two rating agencies with different 
rating approaches. Whereas S&P’s ratings incorporate only probabilities of default, 
Moody’s additionally accounts for expected recovery rates. Empirical evidence  20 
suggests that ratings by Moody’s and recovery rates are negatively correlated 
(MOODY’S 2004). Since recovery rates in 2000 to 2002 were exceptionally low this 
might have led to the more pessimistic ratings by Moody’s. As a consequence, these 
lower ratings should give Moody’s an advantage during a recession with a high number 
of defaults. In answer to this point, it should be pointed out that, as mentioned above, 
Moody’s performs best in the last period with average recovery rates. Furthermore, by 
using validation scores which compare probabilities of default with the observed 
outcome, the inclusion of recovery rates into ratings has no influence since observed 
default frequencies are used for the estimation of probabilities of defaults. 
What are the implications of this paper, or, to put it another way, what can be done with 
benchmarking results of external rating agencies? First of all, even after this study, 
there remains a constant need to rate the raters, and not only the two big ones. Thus, a 
neutral authority like the Bank for International Settlements should introduce a central 
rating and default database incorporating all rated companies worldwide to allow 
frequent benchmarking of the accuracy of the different rating agencies’ default 
predictions. Results should be published to increase the transparency of the market for 
ratings. Perhaps this would be enough to raise the level of competition among the 
existing rating agencies and to increase the effort exerted by the rating agencies to 
analyze the issuers carefully. If public pressure were not enough to force low ranked 
rating agencies to make more effort, regulatory measures should be considered as the 
next forceful step. On the other hand, rating agencies with comparatively high 
performance should be privileged in any process involving recognition by national 
supervisors, should such a process become necessary. 
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 APPENDIX A: Default frequencies across rating grades 
 
The table shows default frequencies of the own sample. They are calculated by dividing the number of ratings by the number of 
defaults for each rating grade for the respective realization periods. Average default frequencies are calculated over the four periods 
2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003. The mapping of the different rating classes of the two rating agencies is indicated in the column "Rating 
grade". All issuers with a rating worse than B3 or B- are lumped together in the mapped rating class 17. Columns five and six provide 
the long-term averages of default frequencies for Moody's (MOODY'S 2004) and S&P (STANDARD&POORS 2004). 
 
   Own sample  Historical averages 
Rating  grade  Mapping  Moody's S&P Moody's S&P 
Aaa/AAA  1  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa1/AA+  2  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa2/AA  3  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa3/AA-  4  0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.02% 
A1/A+  5  0.00% 0.23% 0.00% 0.06% 
A2/A  6  0.20% 0.00% 0.03% 0.05% 
A3/A-  7  0.10% 0.13% 0.04% 0.04% 
Baa1/BBB+  8  0.52% 0.43% 0.19% 0.32% 
Baa2/BBB  9  0.11% 0.59% 0.13% 0.34% 
Baa3/BBB-  10  0.59% 0.50% 0.45% 0.46% 
Ba1/BB+  11  1.19% 0.41% 0.69% 0.64% 
Ba2/BB  12  1.23% 1.39% 0.66% 1.15% 
Ba3/BB-  13  0.86% 3.15% 2.34% 1.97% 
B1/B+  14  3.51% 3.85% 3.22% 3.19% 
B2/B 15  6.94%  13.04%  6.54%  8.99% 
B3/B- 16  9.24%  23.77%  11.55%  13.01% 
C  17  33.51% 41.95% 23.49% 30.85% 
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APPENDIX C: Default frequencies across rating grades for the robustness checks 
 
The table shows default frequencies of the own sample for different sub-samples of the robustness test. In general, default 
frequencies are calculated by dividing the number of ratings by the number of defaults for each rating grade for the respective 
realization periods. Average default frequencies are calculated over the four periods 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003. Watchlist entries 
are anticipated by increasing the respective rating by one notch for positive Watchlist entries and by decreasing it for negative 
entries. The sub-sample with young ratings consists of ratings younger than two years. As a reference point, the end of the 
estimation period is taken, e.g. for the first estimation period 1999 the rating should not date from earlier than January 1, 1997. 
Unsolicited ratings are estimated by inferring that S&P ratings with a pi (public information) indication signify an unsolicited rating 
(POON 2003). 
 
  Watchlist anticipation  Ratings younger than 2 years  Without unsolicited ratings 
Rating  grade  Moody's S&P Moody's S&P Moody's S&P 
Aaa/AAA  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa1/AA+  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa2/AA  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa3/AA-  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
A1/A+  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.56% 0.00% 0.23% 
A2/A  0.00% 0.21% 0.44% 0.00% 0.20% 0.00% 
A3/A-  0.33% 0.13% 0.00% 0.29% 0.12% 0.13% 
Baa1/BBB+  0.52% 0.46% 0.22% 0.00% 0.59% 0.49% 
Baa2/BBB  0.11% 0.38% 0.22% 0.89% 0.12% 0.68% 
Baa3/BBB-  0.47% 0.51% 0.23% 0.43% 0.70% 0.57% 
Ba1/BB+  0.44% 1.03% 1.58% 0.32% 1.38% 0.49% 
Ba2/BB  1.84% 0.85% 2.08% 1.76% 1.39% 1.57% 
Ba3/BB-  0.59% 2.83% 1.32% 3.15% 0.93% 3.49% 
B1/B+  3.53% 3.66% 3.89% 4.29% 3.79% 4.02% 
B2/B 6.83%  10.42%  7.22% 16.54% 7.44% 14.78% 
B3/B- 9.49%  21.83%  12.16%  25.79%  9.56%  26.23% 
C  33.10% 48.69% 38.84% 48.35% 35.98% 47.34% 
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APPENDIX D: Validation measures for the robustness checks 
 
The table below shows the differences in the four validation measures of Table 5. For convenience, these differences are multiplied 
by -1 for the Brier score. Positive differences indicate an advantage for Moody's. One-sided significance levels are given as ***, **, 
and * representing 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively using the percentile bootstrap method of calculating nonparametric confidence 
intervals. Watchlist entries are anticipated by increasing the respective rating by one notch for positive Watchlist entries and by 
decreasing it for negative entries. The sub-sample with young ratings consists of ratings younger than two years. As a reference 
point, the end of the estimation period is taken, e.g. for the first estimation period 1999 the rating should not date from earlier than 
January 1, 1997. Unsolicited ratings are estimated by inferring that S&P ratings with a pi (public information) indication signify an 
unsolicited rating (POON 2003). 
 
Estimation  12/1999 12/2000 12/2001 12/2002 
Realization  period  1/2000-12/2000 1/2001-12/2001 1/2002-12/2002 1/2003-12/2003 
all 
Panel I: Validation measures for issuers rated by Moody's (Watchlist anticipation) 
AUC  0.9058 0.8949 0.8855 0.9285 0.8984 
Brier  score  0.0255 0.0311 0.0261 0.0167 0.0248 
Logarithmic  score -0.0948 -0.1135 -0.0991 -0.0652 -0.0931 
Spherical  score  0.9729 0.9665 0.9722 0.9825 0.9735 
Panel II: Validation measures for issuers rated by S&P (Watchlist anticipation) 
AUC  0.9105 0.9049 0.8814 0.9283 0.9017 
Brier  score  0.0243 0.0297 0.0276 0.0199 0.0254 
Logarithmic  score -0.0919 -0.1091 -0.1036 -0.0717 -0.0941 
Spherical  score  0.9739 0.9679 0.9700 0.9780 0.9725 
Panel III: Validation measures for issuers rated by Moody's (Ratings younger than 2 years) 
AUC  0.8702 0.8727 0.9119 0.9158 0.8871 
Brier  score  0.0384 0.0484 0.0343 0.0249 0.0360 
Logarithmic  score -0.1401 -0.1696 -0.1177 -0.0908 -0.1279 
Spherical  score  0.9587 0.9475 0.9625 0.9734 0.9611 
Panel IV: Validation measures for issuers rated by S&P (Ratings younger than 2 years) 
AUC  0.8801 0.8793 0.9132 0.9045 0.8895 
Brier  score  0.0365 0.0476 0.0355 0.0283 0.0366 
Logarithmic  score -0.1330 -0.1654 -0.1200 -0.0998 -0.1283 
Spherical  score  0.9606 0.9480 0.9608 0.9689 0.9600 
Panel V: Validation measures for issuers rated by Moody's (without unsolicited ratings) 
AUC  0.9022 0.8894 0.8813 0.9281 0.8944 
Brier  score  0.0266 0.0329 0.0271 0.0176 0.0260 
Logarithmic  score -0.0985 -0.1203 -0.1033 -0.0683 -0.0975 
Spherical  score  0.9717 0.9647 0.9710 0.9814 0.9722 
Panel VI: Validation measures for issuers rated by S&P (without unsolicited ratings) 
AUC  0.9034 0.8962 0.8776 0.9251 0.8954 
Brier  score  0.0256 0.0321 0.0286 0.0202 0.0266 
Logarithmic  score -0.0968 -0.1163 -0.1073 -0.0739 -0.0985 
Spherical  score  0.9727 0.9652 0.9691 0.9780 0.9713 
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ENDNOTES 
[1]  LÖFFLER (forthcoming) provides empirical evidence that in addition to commonly used 
validation measures like the area under the ROC curve, other factors, e.g. the investment 
horizon and trading costs, have to be accounted for. Therefore, the economic value of rating 
information has to be assessed in every specific context. 
[2]  Huge efforts are being made by banking regulatory authorities to create so called “central 
credit registers” with unique company numbers, internal ratings and default predictions by 
banks and default data (ESTRELLA 2000). Once these registers have been introduced, 
quantitative benchmarking of the quality of default prediction is possible. 
[3] Defaults for 1999 are used for the adjustments of the estimation period 1999. 
[4] The two rating agencies do not disclose the official numbers of rated issuers. Therefore the 
numbers are calculated using the issuer-weighted default rate and the number of defaults.  
[5] The concept of calibration is also used for single rating classes and for other risk measures, 
such as the loss given default. 
[6] More advanced bootstrap approaches exist, such as the bias corrected and accelerated method 
(EFRON 1987). The advantages of this method are that it is transformation respecting and that 
it is second-order accurate.  
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